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Background 
 
Why checklists?   
 
 Checklists were not needed in the early days of aviation due to aircraft 
simplicity.  On October 30, 1935, that changed.  A model 299 aircraft, later to be 
designated the B-17, crashed shortly after takeoff because the pilots failed to release 
a new rudder and elevator locking mechanism (Schultz, 2012).  After that, 
checklists became standard issue in aircraft, but as aircraft became more 
complicated, more checklist errors surfaced.  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) (1995) using National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, identified 
improper checklist usage as either a probable cause or contributing factor in 37 
major accidents between 1978 and 1990.  Additionally, a safety analysis branch of 
the FAA in the same study concluded that between 1983 and 1993, 279 accidents 
involving checklist errors accounted for 215 fatalities and 260 plus injuries.  The 
highest percentage of checklist related mishaps occurred during the pre-departure 
or departure phases of flight (FAA, 1995).  Two examples of these types of errors 
are confirmed in the NTSB accident reports for Northwest Flight 255 in 1987 and 
Delta Flight 1141 in 1989.   
 
 Checklist error mishap examples. Two airline mishaps, Northwest Flight 255, 
a DC-9 leaving Detroit and Delta Flight 1141, a 727 leaving Dallas/Ft Worth, 
crashed shortly after takeoff.  The primary cause of both mishaps was checklist 
error resulting in the total deaths of 170 people (NTSB, 1987; NTSB 1989).   
 
     Development of electronic checklists (ECL). Boeing started the process of 
studying ECLs in the late 1980s.  ECL development continued from 1990 to 1996 
until the ECL was certified and introduced on the Boeing 777 in response to 
documented checklist errors, a year after the FAA report was released.  The 777 
ECL included all normal and non-normal checklists required for safe operations 
(Arkell, 2006).  The Boeing ECL can also be linked to the Engine Indicating and 
Crew Alerting System (EICAS) (Boorman, 2001a).  The Airbus ECL derivative is 
called the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system and like the 
Boeing ECL includes normal and non-normal procedures for the Airbus 320, 330 
and 340 families (Airbus, 2015; Phoenix Software Solutions, 2002).   
 
Boorman (2001a) describe three levels of ECLs that were postulated for a 
Boeing aircraft accident study and do not formally exist, but can be used to 
fundamentally describe three basic levels of ECL automation. Variant 1 is non-
integrated with the aircraft. Variant 2 is integrated with the airplane so the aircraft 
has the capability to know switch positions to verify checklist completion and is 
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smart enough to display the correct checklist at the appropriate time.  Variant 3 is 
integrated and similar to Variant 2, but adds the capability to automatically alert 
pilots when checklists have not been completed in critical phases of flight. 
     
Practice Innovation 
 
     While electronic checklists were first introduced in 1996, they are ever-
changing.  Therefore, to provide updated information, electronic checklist benefits 
and challenges are examined in practical and human factors terms and 
recommendations developed to chart future ECL development. 
 
Benefits 
      
     Improves information processing and reduces workload. Information 
processing requirements increased significantly as more technology was integrated 
into aircraft.  Coupled with that, humans have a limited short-term memory linked 
to the ability to chunk information (Vidulich, Wickens, Tsang & Flach, 2010).  
ECLs, as automation tools, are designed to make information processing easier.  
Degani and Wiener (1993) in their checklist design study support this concept 
advocating that checklists are designed to prevent reliance on the pilot’s short and 
long-term memory thereby reducing mental workload.  A major function of the 
ECL is to make aircraft systems information gathering easier, enhancing situational 
awareness (Snead, Militello & Ritter, 2004).  
 
     Reduces errors. Reason, as cited by Vidulich et al. (2010), summarized that 
errors are inevitable and are an acceptable price human beings must pay for their 
ability to cope with very difficult informational tasks.  ECLs, an element of 
automation, are designed to keep track of open and completed checklist items and 
reduce errors.  Fundamentally, the Boeing ECL is designed to reduce the errors 
listed in Table 1 (Boorman, 2001b).  In an unpublished simulator study, Boeing 
found a 46% decrease in errors compared to paper checklists (Boorman, 2000).  
Additionally, in a separate Boeing study of aircraft accidents from 1978 to 2001, it 
was found that with variant 3, 19 accidents could have been prevented (Boorman, 
2001a).  Snead, Militello, and Ritter (2004) verified Boorman’s opinion stating that 
since ECLs have been used, there has been a reduction in the number of errors.  To 
help reduce errors, the Boeing electronic checklist requires pilots to accomplish the 
checklist steps in sequence, with some steps tied to aircraft sensors to not allow the 
pilot to bypass the step until the step has been completed.  This is known as a closed 
loop checklist item, essentially an intelligent aircraft checking the human (FAA, 
1996).  By not allowing the pilots to progress further in the checklist process until 
the step is completed, errors are reduced.  For non-normal checklists, the course of 
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action is suggested along with consequences of failing to act appropriately (Arkell, 
2006).  Palmer and Degani (1991) generalize checklist errors into four consolidated 
categories as reduction targets: (1) forgetting what the current item is and thereby 
inadvertently skipping the item; (2) skipping items due to interruptions and 
distractions; (3) intentionally skipping an item and then forgetting to return to it; 
and (4) stating that an item has been accomplished when it was not. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Boorman (2001b) Paper Checklist Error Modes 
 
PAPER CHECKLIST ERROR MODE 
Both Normal and Non-Normal Checklists 
Skipped items 
Place lost in checklist when crew becomes distracted 
Excessive workload due to holding/turning/marking checklist 
pages, recovering dropped checklists 
Incorrect switch is selected 
Checklist is misread or unreadable due to poor illumination 
Normal Checklists (NC) Only 
NC step is skipped 
NC is not initiated 
Non-normal Checklists (NNC) Only 
Incorrect NNC is accomplished 
NNC is skipped or left incomplete 
Incorrect steps accomplished in checklist branching 
Steps required later in flight are not accomplished 
Operational notes or revised limitations following malfunction 
are forgotten 
Wrong steps accomplished when multiple related 
failures have conflicting or redundant actions 
Excessive cognitive workload in multiple failure 
case leads to omitted NNC or other errors 
           
      
     Can improve response time. Sharno, Dror and Degani (1998) in a study using 
20 Boeing 747 crewmembers compared electronic to paper media in the 
performance of information search and performance calculation problems. They 
found that electronic media outperformed paper media 1.3 to 1 in terms of correct 
responses and response time was twice as fast.  While reducing errors are the 
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primary ECL focus, improved efficiency in task demanding situations is a desired 
by-product (D. Boorman, personal communication, October 31, 2015).   
 
Challenges 
  
     Unexpected situations. An inherent problem with electronic, like paper, 
checklists is the inability to cover all non-normal situations a crew might encounter 
(Snead et al., 2004). No checklist is perfect; hence unique situations can occur 
requiring pilot experience and judgment to solve the problem.   
 
     May not identify larger scope problems. The B-2 Multiple Display Unit 
(MDU) displays multiple advisory, caution and warning lights and parallels 
commercial aircraft applications.  While the MDU is a good tool for providing 
information about individual warning lights, it lacks the ability to associate the 
warning lights together to identify a larger problem that exists (Snead et al., 2004).  
In this case, it is up to the pilot to make that decision relying on experience and 
systems knowledge.   
 
     Keyhole property. The keyhole property occurs when pilots forget where to 
find needed information or get lost in the complexity of menus.  To alleviate this, 
checklist menus need to be planned and displayed properly (Mallis, Banks & 
Dinges, 2010). 
 
     Errors can still occur. While the number of errors have been reduced, human 
error still can and most likely will occur.  In a study of 135 procedural errors, 10 
paper/ECL checklist errors were noted equating to error rate of 7.4% (Sharno et al., 
1998). One fundamental error that might occur with glass cockpit displays, such as 
the electronic checklist, is an “out of sight, out of mind” phenomenon where pilots 
have tunneled attention and forget or ignore information outside of the current focus 
(Mallis et al. 2010, p. 450).  This tunneling effect can occur when focused on the 
electronic checklist, the paper checklist, or on another issue in the cockpit, 
degrading situational awareness.  
 
     Added costs. ECLs are incorporated in new aircraft such as the Boeing 787, and 
the user can have the checklists modified, but not without added expense to the 
airlines. Additionally, FAA Advisory Circular 120-64 levies certification, training, 
and currency requirements and stipulates that paper checklists with the same 
content be carried at all times in the aircraft (FAA, 1996).  Training, software 
upgrades, and component maintenance are also added costs. 
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     Not on all aircraft. Variant 3 electronic normal and non-normal checklists are 
incorporated on later Boeing aircraft such as 777, 787 and 747-800.  Later Airbus 
aircraft; 320, 330 and 340, incorporate ECLs for normal procedures, and non-
normal procedures.  Additionally, Boeing has also integrated an iPad based 
checklist system, often called the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) on non-ECL aircraft.  
One drawback of the iPad type checklist is the non-integration aspect of not being 
able to monitor aircraft systems.  Due to non-integration, open loop checklist items 
may occur when the airplane has no way of checking itself to see if the checklist 
item was completed, therefore preventing crew feedback if an error occurs 
(Boorman, 2001a).  The EFB also presents additional FAA requirements listed in 
Advisory Circular 120-76C that must be complied with (FAA, 2014).   
 
     Paper checklists are still required. The FAA requires paper checklists even 
when the aircraft has ECLs (FAA, 1996).  The fundamental difference between 
Boeing and Airbus ECLs is that the Boeing version is a user-modifiable checklist 
system while the Airbus checklist is not.  Having a modifiable checklist improves 
operational flexibility. In Boeing aircraft, paper checklists are carried in case of 
system failure, since both paper and electronic checklists have the same items (D. 
Boorman, personal communication, October 31, 2015).  For some Airbus ECLs, all 
non-normal situations are not covered and/or incomplete and therefore require 
paper checklists to supplement or replace the electronic procedures (Scribd, 2015).  
In this case, the ECL provides for safety of flight items only, but there are no 
checklist flows for non-normal procedures.  Having to go back and forth between 
paper and electronic checklists increases cognitive workload and potential errors.  
A modifiable checklist eliminates these issues.  According to Dr. John Sabel, an 
Embry-Riddle Aviation University Assistant Professor, and airline Captain with 
18,000 hours of flying time, incompleteness of ECLs can also be due to untimely 
software upgrades to non-modifiable electronic checklists (Personal 
communication, August 30, 2015).  Dr. Sabel’s assertion is supported by a lengthy 
detailed upgrade process without time constraints that are listed in FAA Advisory 
Circular 120-64 (FAA, 2006).  Finally, electrical failures may render the ECL 
screen unusable and therefore, paper checklists provide redundancy (NTSB, 2008).   
 
     Automation dependency. ECLs can aid human information processing by 
monitoring checklist completion and aircraft systems.  It cannot be assumed, 
however, that the system provides accurate redundancy to human monitoring.  Too 
much dependency on automation of electronic checklists can result in a loss of pilot 
situational awareness (Palmer & Degani, 1991).  The FAA supports this by 
advocating in Advisory Circular 120-64 that some checklist item callouts “may be 
necessary to ensure total crew awareness or airplane status” (FAA, 1996, p. 8).   
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     Frequency of use dichotomy. Pilots must maintain an active not passive 
involvement using ECLs, because loss of situational awareness (SA) can still be a 
problem.  A potential new ECL error related to SA is “frequency of use dichotomy” 
which can occur when something such as a non-normal procedure is not used very 
often and when used under high workload stress conditions presents difficulties 
(Boorman, 2000, p. 2) 
 
     Passive operator involvement. When pilots are performing monitoring and are 
not actively involved, monitoring performance can decline.  Additionally, too much 
system trust can degrade effective monitoring capability.  If SA is lost, being 
responsive when automation fails is unlikely (Moulova, Hancock, Jones & 
Vincenzi, 2010). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
       
      ECLs have had a significant impact reducing normal and to some extent, non-
normal checklist execution errors.  For normal checklist items, if integrated with 
the aircraft, ECLs eliminate or reduce many of the paper checklist error modes by 
using closed loop checklist processing enhancing safety.  Additionally, ECLs make 
it easier to gather information about aircraft systems enhancing information 
processing, reducing mental workload and enhancing situational awareness. 
Unfortunately, many older aircraft do not incorporate normal procedures electronic 
checklists.  In these cases, the EFB / iPad checklist provides a workable, but non-
optimum solution since the device is not integrated with the aircraft.   
 
     For non-normal procedures, several obstacles remain.  First, ECLs bring more 
potential error modes including automation dependency, the keyhole effect, 
monitoring complacency, out of sight and out of mind, and the potential for 
increased frequency of use dichotomy.  Second, the future path of technology needs 
to be defined.  Like paper checklists, the machine cannot be programmed for all 
possible non-normal situations and in many cases cannot yet reason a larger 
problem when multiple alerts are present.   
 
     Concurrently with defining the future path, electronic checklists levels of 
automation need to be standardized both in industry and FAA using the Boeing 
variant levels and incorporating a fourth level of automation for no electronic 
checklist capability.  The proposed levels are illustrated in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
   
Proposed Electronic Checklist Levels of Automation 
 
Level of 
Automation 
Level Description Example System 
Level 0 No electronic checklist 
on aircraft 
None. 
Level 1 Electronic checklist not 
integrated with aircraft. 
Electronic flight 
bag. 
Level 2 Electronic checklist 
integrated with aircraft 
and aircraft has the 
ability to verify some or 
all checklist items 
complete 
Electronic checklist 
on an Airbus 330. 
Level 3 Electronic checklist 
integrated with aircraft, 
aircraft has the ability to 
verify some or all 
checklist items complete 
and aircraft has the 
ability to self-identify 
checklist errors without 
operator interaction. 
Upgraded 
electronic checklist 
on Boeing 777 and 
787. 
 
    
     Using the proposed levels of automation, level 3 is the highest variant that 
currently exists.  However, an important consideration is the next ECL automation 
level.  To move ECL development forward, automation level goals should be set as 
a team effort between aircraft manufacturers, FAA, NASA and airlines.  Also, to 
reduce cognitive workload and error potential, the ECL standard needs to be a 
modifiable checklist.  If the decision is to retain non-modifiable checklists, the 
lengthy ECL upgrade time needs to be examined and streamlined by the FAA in 
concert with the airlines. 
 
While it may seem the challenges outweigh the benefits, ECL research needs to 
continue to reap safety benefits of reducing and/or eliminating errors.  As recently 
as 2014, 30% of Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) checklist incidents 
listed were pilot induced (NASA, 2015).  Preventing even one mishap such as 
Northwest Flight 255 or Delta Flight 1141 is worth the effort in lives saved.   
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